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This Study empirically examines the core assumption of social capital argument 
that general trust promotes inter-group relation. More specifically, The study 
attempts to show how the trust in political institutions, which has been assumed 
to have close relationship with general trust, affects range and composition of 
personal network. Based on nationally representative data collected by ISDPR 
(Institute for Social development and Policy Research), this study shows that  
confidence in government increases the range of personal networks in terms of 
regional background. In addition, confidence in government also affects the 
composition of personal networks. The discussion focuses on the relationship 
between the instrumental value of social relationships and performance of the 
government. Although the mechanism varies across the characteristics of social 
parameter, this study concludes that the confidence in government increases the 
inter-group relationships.
Key Words: Social Capital, Confidence, Personal networks, Instrumental Aspects 
of Social Relationships.
INTRODUCTION
Trust is an essential element of social relationship. While most of 
classical sociologists implicitly deal with this topic (Mistzal, 1996: 33-64), 
it was not long before it gets located at the center of sociological 
theorizing about contemporary society (Luhmann, 1979; Barber, 1983; 
Giddens, 1989). More recent studies on this topic, associated with 
popularity of social capital, emphasize the public good aspects of trust. 
Specifically, recent studies consider the trust as core dimension of social 
capital as a feature of communities and nation, inhered in social 
structure that produces socially beneficial outcomes. The school of social 
capital asserts that the high level of general trust toward people outside 
immediate kin or close social networks, is instrumental in effective 
* This study was supported by Soongsil University Research Fund. I would like to 
acknowledge helpful comments of Professor Yee Jayeol and other reviewers. However, 
all shortcomings of this study should be attributed to the author.
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governance, economic prosperity, and low crime rate and many other 
socially desirable outcomes (Coleman, 1988; Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 
1993; Sampson et al., 1999; Wolcock, 1998). While earlier works on 
social capital are largely ignorant of the role of government, 
theoretically informed discussion and empirical studies suggest that the 
trust in government should be considered as one of essential elements 
of social capital (Levy, 1996; Brehm and Raun, 1997; Paxton, 1999). 
The core assumption of those social capital studies is that the high 
level of general trust or strong confidence in government enables 
individuals to form a relationship outside close relationship where trust 
is based on direct knowledge on them. It is these ties that provide an 
opportunity to learn general reciprocity with each individual (Putnam, 
1993), reduce transaction cost in economic transaction (Fukuyama, 1995; 
Arrow, 1974), and facilitate global coordination and cooperation among 
social groups, by forming cross-cutting ties between them otherwise 
segmented. (Granovetter, 1973; Wolcock, 1998).
However, this assumption that general trust promotes inter-group 
relation has never been empirically examined. The study attempts to 
show how the trust in political institutions, which has been assumed to 
have close relationship with general trust (Paxton, 1998; Brehm and 
Raun, 1997), affects range and composition of personal network.
TRUST, GENERAL TRUST AND TRUST IN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
Trust, defined here as expectation toward other social actors’ intention 
and competence (Barber, 1983: 9), is an essential aspect of society, 
because the consequence of virtually all social action is contingent on 
other’s fiduciary responsibility and technical competence. Very few 
inter-personal relationships are based entirely on what is known with 
certainty (Simmel, 1971: 178). In a demographically large and 
structurally complicated system, a person often should interact with 
others who are not known well or even at all (Lewis and Weigert, 1985: 
973). The functional differentiation, technological progress, and 
development of expertise system (Giddens, 1989) requires individuals to 
adjust the trusting expectations to social roles such as lawyer or medical 
doctor, rather than persons (Sztompka, 1999; Seligman, 1997). 
Regardless of one’s own trust toward political leaders, under the 
violence of property or other rights, individuals typically resort to legal 
authority rather than other private protection (Gambetta, 1988). 
Those examples show the individuals in modern complex system 
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should have the expectation toward (1) individuals based on personal 
knowledge (2) “absent others” constructed as a real collectivity in our 
imagination (Sztompka, 1999: 42) and (3) various institutions. To clarify 
the diversity in the object of trust, Luhmann (1979) and Giddens (1989) 
propose the distinction between system trust and interpersonal trust. 
However, the relationships among these various dimensions of trust 
have not been discussed thoroughly. As following discussion clarifies, 
we will argue that the general trust has more common with trust in 
institution than interpersonal trust.
To begin with, the trust toward generalized other and other social 
institution results from the process of modernization characterized by 
complex social differentiation, while trust in familiar others is 
omnipresent in all human societies.1 With the development of abstract 
systems, trust in impersonal principles, as well as in anonymous others, 
become indispensable to social existence (Giddens, 1989: 199-120). 
Besides this genealogical dissimilarity between interpersonal trust and 
general trust, the bases of expectation of these two trust regarding 
person is quite different. The bases of interpersonal trust is information 
on trustee’s emotion, moral commitment and interest.2 Note that if the 
interpersonal trust is based on the information one has about potential 
trustees, it cannot be a model for enduringly cooperative and trusting 
relationship between strangers (Hawthorn, 1988: 113). 
In fact, the trust toward generalized others is not exactly the trust in 
the strict sense, because most of trusting relationship in this sense is 
context-specific. In other words, one’s trust toward a certain individual 
is regarding a specific context or the amount of pending interest. For 
example, As Wellman and Wortley noted (1990), the specific content of 
social support is different across the kind of relationship. Besides, the 
extent to trust which one needs to entering trusting relationship is the 
function of the potential gain (or loss) (Coleman, 1990). The higher 
interests at stakes, we need higher degree of trust. 
From the perspective understanding the trust as third party relation 
1 Even in the so-called nature state without government, the minimum range of trust 
is essential. Gellner (1988) shows that the nature state is not struggle among everybody, 
but struggle between a number of cohesive social circles.
2 When emotion is involved, the trust of A on B is based on the belief that B likes A 
so much that B would not do something farm to A. Morality based trust states that A 
trust B that B has strong moral commitment to reciprocate A’s favor. Interested driven 
trust is based on the belief that it is B’s incentive to honor A’s trust for seeking long-term 
benefit with A or the potential defamation of reputation if B.
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including specific condition or context, the generalized trust is 
understood as “optimistic assessment of trustworthiness of generalized 
others” (Hardin, 2001: 15), “(which) .... must largely be learned .... from 
generalizations from past encounters with other people” (Hardin, 1993: 
509). From this perspective, the trust toward general other is the 
outcome of individual's experience including those of socialization. If 
one encounters with more trustworthy people outside of her own 
networks than others, she is likely to have higher level of general trust.
In addition, the tension can be observed in knowledge based trust 
and trust toward generalized others. On the one hand, the 
developmental psychologists shows that the propensity to trust have 
been learned from the apparently justified trusting of family, friends, 
and others while infants and children. In this sense, interpersonal trust 
provides the framework for general trust in individual level. Therefore, 
the higher interpersonal trust would increase the possibility of entering 
trusting relations (Ho and Kochen, 1987). However, some sociologists 
present somewhat different view. As Blau and his colleagues suggest 
(1984: 12-13), the strong in-group bonds are disintegrative force because 
they tend to prevent extensive inter-group relation. In other words, The 
strong attachment to family, or other familiar social groups may lead to 
fragment the society into exclusive groupings. In the other direction of 
causality, the difficulty in inter-group relation might increase the 
necessity of knowledge based trust. For instance, the exclusion from 
main-stream society consolidates the solidarity of immigrants (Portes 
and Sensenbrenner, 1993).
Finally, there is inherent positive relationship between general trust 
and the confidence in government.3 From cumulative GSS data, Brehm 
and Rahn (1997) reports that there is reciprocal positive relationship 
between general trust and confidence in government measured in 
individual level. Especially, the magnitude of effect of confidence in 
government on general trust is substantial (Brehm and Rahn 1997: 
1012). The similar reciprocal relationship is also observed in macro-level 
study. Knack and Keeper (1997) finds that (1) trust are linked to better 
performance of government institutions, and (2) the independence of 
courts have an positive influence on the level of general trust in nations. 
Those empirical studies support that the notion that the performance of 
government should play a critical role in raising or destroying the trust 
3 This does not mean that they form a common factor (Smith, 1997), or the correlates 
of them are identical (Lipset and Schenider, 1987). 
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toward generalized others (Levy, 1996, 2000; Skocpol, 1996).
The fact that the trust presupposes uncertainty, which is critically 
dependent on the performance of government explains this pattern. The 
notion of Government as a provider of fair and consistent game of rule, 
is one of a key element in Weber’s theory of capitalistic development 
(Weber, 1995). The central argument of this theory is that rational state 
and universally applies system of law provides the basis for rationality 
of capitalistic economic system, that is calculable and predictable system 
of banking, investment, contracts and property (Collins, 1986: 30). 
Because trust is always to subject to possibility of being breached, 
trust requires “social structure in which it is to the potential trustee's 
interest to be trustworthy” (Coleman, 1990: 111). Unlike interpersonal 
trust where the decision of trust is based on personal knowledge, hence, 
the untrustworthy behavior can be punished in terms of degradation of 
reputation and honor, the formal institution is the only agency 
monitoring and sanctioning the conduct of the trustee in case of general 
trust. Hence, the strong confidence in government reduces the perceived 
risk in entering trusting relationship with others whose probability of 
keeping trust is not known to individuals. Alternatively, the competent 
and fair enforcement of private agreements and laws provides the 
incentive for everyone in society to be trustworthy, which increases the 
probability of encounters trustworthy people. If general trust is inducted 
generalization from past experience, as Hardin suggests, the more 
trustworthy people one meet, her general trust would be higher.
In sum, the fair performance of government is closely related to the 
general trust or general trustworthiness. Structurally, The fair 
performance of government is closely related to the general trust or 
general trustworthiness Cognitively, the confidence in government 
reduces the perceived uncertainty outside of close network, which 
increase the probability to placing toward others with little personal 
knowledge.
The preceding discussion argues that the general trust should be 
regarded as system trust with confidence in institutions. Based on this 
discussion, we can reformulate the core argument of social capital as 
following. System trust produce a set of socially desirable outcome by 
affecting the interpersonal trust. 
CONFIDENCE IN INSTITUTIONS AND PERSONAL NETWORK
From previous studies on social capital and personal network, we can 
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find two sets of argument regarding the relationship between system 
trust and personal network.
Trust and range: The first line of argument predicts that the confidence 
in institutions or general trust affect diversity of personal network. The 
studies on social capital suggest that the tie beyond one’s own intimate 
group diffuses norms of general reciprocity and facilitate global 
coordination in the community. We will discuss two most influential 
works. In Putnam’s view, networks of civic engagement are an essential 
from of social capital, partly because it provides the opportunity for 
learning norms of reciprocity and partly because it facilitates the flow 
of information regarding individuals (1993: 173-174). The latter 
mechanism is based on the assumption that it functions as “weak ties 
.... encompass [ing]broad segments of society” (Putnam, 1993: 175). 
Though the casual direction is quite ambiguous between general trust 
and networks of civic engagement, he clearly links the broad 
inter-group interaction to trust. The central argument of Fukuyama 
(1995: 31) is that the trust beyond family affects firm size “in the long 
run .... affecting competitiveness.” High degree of trust between 
individual who were not related to one another contributes to develop 
large, modern, rationally organized, professionally managed 
corporations (Fukuyama, 1995: 57). In sum, these arguments are, 
essentially, based on the notion that the general trust facilitates 
inter-group relations. 
Some experimental studies (Yamagish and Yamagish, 1994; Yamagish 
et al., 1998) reports the results consistent with the prediction. Yamagish 
and Yamagish (1994) found general trust in Japan is lower than that of 
U.S., unlike common conception that Japanese Society is characterized 
by trust. The distinction between assurance and trust is proposed to 
solve this ‘seeming inconsistency.’ According to them, trust is based on 
the inference of the interaction partner’s personal traits and intentions, 
whereas assurance is based on the knowledge of incentive structure 
surrounding social relationship. According to them, the formation of 
close and stable relationship reduces the risk resulting from inability to 
detect partner’s intention by providing sufficient information on 
partner’s intentions and developing mutual emotional attachment or 
relation specific assets. Therefore, the more one is skeptical about the 
intention of others beyond her personal knowledge, she is more likely 
to form committed relationship to the others. According to them, the 
long-term transaction relationship should be regarded as manifestation 
of actors’ effort to reduce uncertainties outside those relationships, 
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where the bases of cooperation is transformed from trust to assurance. 
Consistent with this prediction as well as the social capital argument, 
low trusters tend to form committed relations more strongly than high 
trusters. In other words, low trust toward unfamiliar others reduce the 
probability of entering new relationships. Kollock’s (1994) experiment 
also shows that the high uncertainty in transaction regarding the quality 
of goods increases the probability of committed relationship. 
While these studies reports highly consistent result with the theories 
of social capital, there are also limitations. Because those result comes 
from experimental settings, the dependent variable of these experiments 
is not exactly about the probability of inter-group relation but duration 
and closeness, key aspects of tie strength. Though the tie strength is 
related to inter-group relation (Burt, 1991: 423), those studies do not 
provide direct support the effects of general trust on inter-group 
relation.
The following analysis, to my best knowledge, is the first attempt to 
showing the effects of confidence in government, or more generally 
system trust, on range of personal network in real world. In network 
approaches, the relations have range to the extent that they connect an 
actor with extensive diversity of other actors (Burt, 1983: 176). The 
diversity can be measured in two ways: diversity among alters and 
difference between alter and egos. While the former are interested in 
diversity perse, second measure is closely related to inter-group relations 
(Marsden, 1991: 404).4 Since the studies social capital focused on 
inter-group relations, (Wolcock, 1998; Paxton, 1999), this paper will 
concern difference between respondent and alters, in terms of age, 
education, sex and region.
Hypothesis 1: the more one has confidence in political institutions, the more 
heterogeneous one’s network would be.
Hypotheisis 1-a. the higher confidence one has in government, the more 
difference between one and one’s alters in terms of educational attainment.
Hypotheisis 1-b. the higher confidence one has in government, the more 
difference between one and one’s alters in terms of age.
Hypotheisis 1-c. the higher confidence one has in government, the higher 
proportion of alters have different regional background than ego.
Hypotheisis 1-d. the higher confidence one has in government, the higher 
proportion of alters are different gender than ego.
4 Since most of personal networks tend to have at least some of homophilous ties, 
these two should be highly correlate. 
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Trust and Contact Status: The fair and effective performance of 
government affects to the extent how economic action is embedded in 
social relationship. Let’s return to earlier example comparing rubber 
market with rice market. In this example, the social relationship with 
those producing rubber is more instrumental than that with farmer 
harvesting rice. This example shows that the effect of social relationship 
on economic welfare is contingent on the social uncertainty. DiMaggio 
and Louch (1998) report that the higher social uncertainty is related to 
active utilization of pre-existing networks. 
Given social uncertainty is substantially influenced by universal and 
effective application of laws, the good performance of government can 
reduce the relative importance of social tie on social attainment. 
The association between universal law and relative importance of 
social tie is well observed in the studies of U.S. labor market. Those 
studies suggest that the open hiring-posting or advertising, recruiting 
through employment agencies or promotion according to seniority, 
compared with referral hiring, substantially reduces the inequality 
across gender and race (Kallerberg et al., 1996; Reskin and McBrier, 
2000; Waldinger and Bailey, 1991). In addition, Reskin shows that 
formalization of personnel practice tends to reduce gender inequality in 
getting ahead. The inequality in social capital across gender and race, 
with other subjective bias such as stereotyping, is responsible for this 
pattern (Reskin and McBrier, 2000: 226). That is, given the disadvantage 
of women and minority in social resource (Lin, 2002), The formalizing 
personnel practice and open hiring seem to reduce the influence of 
unequal social resource on the process of hiring and promotion. 
Those studies indicate that the effective application of universal rules 
will be negatively related to the relative importance of social capital in 
individual attainments. Therefore, the less one has confidence in 
political institution, the more she is likely to try to organize her network 
instrumentally effective.
The studies of social resource consistently reports the effects of 
contact status. they consistently evidence that the status of influential 
person is positively associated with one’s current status, controlling for 
education and first or prior job status. These studies suggest that 
network composed with high status alter tend to be instrumentally 
effective. Most of network studies (Burt, 1983; Lin et al., 1981; Campbell 
et al., 1986) considers mean or maximum status of alters as one of 
central aspect of network composition. Therefore, we can hypothesize.
CONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT AND PERSONAL NETWORKS 9
Hypothesis 2: the more one has confidence in political institutions, the lower 
contact status of alters 
Hypotheisis 2-a. the higher confidence one has in government, the lower 
Highest contact status of alters 
Hypothesis 2-b. the higher confidence one has in government, the lower 
mean contact status of alters 
DATA AND METHOD
The data are national survey conducted by ISDPR (Institute for Social 
development and Policy Research) in Seoul National University. The 
sampling is designed for representative sample in terms of region, age 
and gender. Among 1768 respondents, highly educated was slightly 
over-sampled. However, the post-stratification weights does not results 
substantially. Therefore, the results presented below come from 
un-weighted data. 
The data of personal network data typically have problem of sample 
selection because at least some of respondents do not report none of 
alters and their characteristics (Marsden, 1987). In addition, because the 
following analyses concern the characteristics of non-kin alters, the 
extent of exclusion is larger than previous studies based on similar 
instruments. The Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979) is used for 
redress this issue. The preliminary analyses observe no effects of 
selection in models predicting homophily in region, age, and sex, we 
will just report the results of OLS (Ordinary Least Square method) 
regarding those variables. Regarding the educational difference and 
contact status, I will report the results of selection models.5 
The independent variable of the analysis comes from items asking 
confidence in 10 institutions from administration to university. The 
result of exploratory factor analysis of those ten items is presented in 
table 1.
The rotated factor  loading shows that  the confidence in 
administration, party and court forms a distinctive dimension (i.e. the 
factor loading is higher than .6), while confidence in other institutions 
such as civic organization, press, military, university, large economic 
firms (jaebol). The reliability of three items regarding government are 
.7796, which is highly acceptable given small number of items. The mean 
of these items are constructed as “the confidence in governments.”
5 Both results from selection model and OLS is substantially identical.
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TABLE 1. THE ROTATED FACTOR LOADINGS OF 10 INSTITUTIONS
(Principal Component Analysis, Varimax Rotation)
 * the factor loading whose absolute value is higher than .6 are presented)
Dependent variable: The early discussion suggests that the high 
truster are more likely to establish a relationship with others who are 
different in various dimensions affecting social interaction. As noted 
earlier, out diversity measure taps the difference between ego and 
alters. Besides the fact that social capital school concerns the inter-group 
relations, The selection of this measure better serves to minimize the 
excluded cases given we are interested in relationship between ego and 
non-kin alters. We exclude kin-alters because most of kinship ties are 
given to others, hence, the effects of one’s trust could not affect the 
diversity of kinship ties.6 
Previous studies finds that the composition and characteristics of 
personal network are influenced by social-demographic characteristics 
such as gender, education (Marsden, 1987; Fisher, 1982), occupation 
(Laumann, 1973; Willmott, 1987), and regional characteristics (Fisher, 
1982). Therefore, To estimate the effect of trust on network range and 
composition, age, gender, marital status, the region size respondents 
lives in, occupational characteristics are controlled. Male, and currently 
married status, metro-politan area are baseline category in following 
specification. Education and household income, originally asked in 
categorical terms, will be treated as interval scale using mid-point of 
6 As Burt (1991) and Marsden (1987) reports, the kin-relationship increase homophily 
of race and religion, while it decrease the homophily of age, sex and education.











Explained variance 34.09% 14.66%
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each category. If the square term of age was found to be significant, we 
report the results including square term. Otherwise, only linear term 
was presented in the results. To control the characteristics of the size of 
community, the area respondents inhabits was divided as the 
metropolitan area, city, and rural town, and city and rural area are 
included as dummy variables.
RESULT 
Table 2 reports the bivariate correlations among variables in the 
model. It reveals a number of relevant points that would help to 
understand following analysis. First, the correlations among variables 
TABLE 2. SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS AND BIVARIATE CORRELATION





































Trust .18** .06** 2.36
Education -.48** -.17** -.14** 12.57
Income -.11** .02 -.01* .32** 207.25
Professional .01 -.06* -.03 .21** .15** 0.04
Rural .13** -.01 .07** -.18** -.19** -.07** .24
City -.06** -.02 -.01 -.01 .-07** .01 -.34** .26
Farm .27** -.12** .04 -.31** -.17** -.07** .41** -.04 .10
Education
homophily
-.67** .03 .00 .78** .01 .01 -.05 -.00 -.09** .59
Regional
homophily
-.13** -.05 -.06* -.04 -.04 -.09** .12** -.05 .12** .03 .67
Mean age
difference
.20** -.01 .08** -.14** -.05 .07* .08** -.03 .11** -.21 -.09** 3.58
Sex
homophily
.11** -.08* .01 -.03 -.05 -.02 .01 .05 -.01 .08* -.02 -.09** .88
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measuring respondent’s characteristics exhibits expected direction7 
except that age is negatively associated with household income. This 
unexpected direction is due to the fact that the extent of negative 
association between education and age is stronger than in that of U.S.8 
Second, the relationship between three range variables reveals that there 
is some intersection effects between regional homophily and age 
difference. (Blau et al., 1984) Third, there are several respondent’s 
characteristics associated with confidence in political institutions. 
Education and income shows negative association and female, age and 
residing in rural area have positive association. 
Finally, the confidence in political institutions shows expected 
relationship with most of dependent variables. That is, it is negatively 
associated with composition of personal networks and positively 
associated with the range of personal networks except education 
difference and sex homophily.
We will examine whether the relationship between confidence and 
outcome variables are still observed when other characteristics are 
controlled. Before that, we will examine the factors affecting the 
confidence in political institutions more carefully.
Table 3 presents the results of regression on confidence in 
government. With Conventional 5% significance level, only two factors 
influence the level of confidence. First, income is negatively associated 
with confidence. The negative association between income and 
confidence is observed in the studies on the U.S. and other countries. 
This pattern is quite counter-intuitive if we assume that those with 
higher income tend to benefit from current political system. Hibbing 
and Thesis-Morse (1995: 115) attributes the negative association between 
income and confidence to higher expectation of those with higher 
income. The marginally significant (p = .055) negative coefficient of 
education is also quite consistent with their explanation. 
Second, the older cohort exhibits stronger confidence in government. 
Though the careful examination of this pattern is beyond this paper’s 
concern, one of possible explanation is related to the peculiar process of 
modernization in Korean. While the older cohort experience the benefits 
from rapid growth led by government before early 80s, the younger 
cohort provided the strong support for the social movement for the 
democracy. While representative democracy in formal sense is 
7 For example, females are, on average, less educated. However, household income 
does not exhibit gender difference.
8 Controlling for education, income and age are positively related.
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TABLE 3. THE RESULTS OF OLS ON CONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT
* basesline group is male
** baseline group is metropolitan area
*** baseline groups are While collar, Blue collar, students and housewife and others.
established in Korea, the actual process of political decision is still 
characterized by patron-client relationship between congressman and 
boss who tend to represent a specific local area. This quite pre-modern 
practice seem to obviously disappoint the younger generation who have 
also higher expectation of democratic political system.
The first three columns of Table 4 presents the results of three OLS 
regression on the homophily between nonkin alters and respondents in 
terms of age, gender and region.
Regional difference: the region is meaningful dimension of social 
interaction In Korea. As hypothesized, trust in confidence decreases the 
regional homophily. That is, the high truster are more likely to discuss 
important matters with those with different regional background. In 
addition, the first column of table 4 reveals that regional homophily is 
dominantly affected by opportunity structure of social interaction (Blau 
and Schwartz, 1984). Compared with metropolitan area, characterized 
by high mobility, and therefore diversity of population, residents in 
small city and rural area, especially in agricultural area exhibits higher 
regional homophily.9
Age difference: The effect of confidence in age difference is not 
9 The expected relationship between confidence and regional homophily is observed in 
all of three regions.
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TABLE 4. THE RESULTS OF OLS AND SAMPLE SELECTION MODEL (HECKMAN) ON 
SELECTED NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS AMONG NON-KIN ALTERS
* the t-values are presented in parenthesis
** *.<05 **<.01 ***<0.001
significant, though the direction is consistent with our hypothesis. The 
older cohort shows more range in terms of age. In addition, being 
divorced, widowed, separated also increase the mean difference of age.
Sex homophily: there is no influence of confidence on age diversity. 
Compared with married people, never married or other married exhibits 
less degree of gender homophily. Interestingly, female is less likely to 
have gender-homophilous networks.
The last three columns of table 4 presents the results of Heckman 
selection regression on educational difference between egos and alters, 
mean education status of alters and maximum education attainment of 
alters. In terms of education homophily, confidence has no effects on 
the range of networks. The last two column of table 4 shows that the 
less confidence in government increase the maximum and mean status 
of alters measured as educational attainment. Note that this effect is 
observed controlling for opportunity of association measured as ego’s 
education and person’s regional characteristics, which has significant 
influence on both of dependent variables as well as regional 





status of alters 
Trust in
government -0.034 (2.08) * -0.162 (1.93) * -0.200 (2.15) *
age30-39 -0.121 (3.14) ** -0.104 (0.52) 0.019 (0.09)
age40-49 -0.115 (2.59) ** 0.157 (0.66) 0.164 (0.64)
age50-59 -0.067 (1.28) -0.314 (1.05) -0.247 (0.76)
Female -0.037 (1.43) -0.225 (1.73) -0.295 (2.05) *
Income 0.000 (0.14) 0.001 (1.60) 0.001 (1.90)
Education 0.000 (1.65) 0.022 (17.61) *** 0.021 (14.95) ***
Rural 0.097 (2.83) ** -0.655 (3.75) *** -0.655 (3.38) ***
City 0.074 (2.49) ** -0.138 (0.91) -0.162 (0.96)
Nevmar 0.091 (2.36) ** -0.029 (0.13) 0.149 (0.62)
Omar 0.027 (0.55) -0.038 (0.14) 0.096 (0.33)
Farm 0.148 (2.95) ** -1.447 (5.59) *** -1.369 (4.68) ***
_cons 0.845 (9.92) 10.937 (25.78) 11.468 (21.58)
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negative coefficients of female, though not significant, is also consistent 
with previous studies. Therefore, we can conclude that the lower truster 
tend to form an relationship with higher status alters, who are effective 
in the instrumental utilization of personal relationships.
DISCUSSION
The result of this study shows that confidence in government increase 
probability of inter-group relationships in terms of region. Though we 
do not observe the effects of confidence on inter-group relationships in 
other dimensions, we interpret these results supporting the basic 
assumption of social capital argument. Although the gender and age are 
significant factors in prescribing the adequate form of interaction 
especially in societies under the influence of Confucianism, they are not 
the major dimension of social cleavage in Korean society, especially in 
private social relationships. On the other hand, region is very important 
factors governing political and economic competition as well as marital 
formation. Therefore, the region is more suitable dimension to test the 
effects of system trust. 
While system trust does not affect the inter-status group relationships, 
it affects the status of alters. We interpret this finding as suggesting that 
the lower level of confidence in government is linked to the perception 
of to what extent one’s individual attainment depends on social 
resource one has. As we discussed, the lower trust is intrinsically 
related to sensitiveness to the value of social capital, because the 
efficient application of universal law is closely related to the extent how 
other factors besides one’s own human or financial capital influence the 
process of social attainment. Therefore, we can conclude that the lower 
trusters are more likely to seek prestige in their association.
Let us assume that social interactions are only prescribed by “prestige 
hypothesis” suggesting that individuals want to associate with those 
with high status (Laumann, 1966). In this situation, While lower status 
people want to interact with higher status, their wish is not reciprocated 
by higher status people who has no incentive to interact with lower 
status people (Gould, 2002). Hence, we would observe association table 
characterized by perfect immobility suggested by “like-me hypothesis,” 
alternative hypothesis of “prestige hypothesis.” The above discussion 
suggests that the more people are sensitive to prestige of alters in their 
association, the less observed inter-group relationships in a given 
society. Hence, we can conclude that a high level of confidence in 
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government increases the permeability among status groups.
In sum, the effects of social capital on inter-group relationships 
depends on the parameters of social interaction. That is, in nominal 
parameters such as region, the system trust directly promotes 
inter-group relationships. On the other hand, though the causal 
mechanism is more complex in interval parameters, still we expect that 
system trust promotes inter-status group relationships.
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